This summary outlines the main findings
of the newly updated country profile on internal displacement in the Philippines.
The profile was prepared by the Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee
Council, which monitors and analyses internal displacement in over 50 countries
worldwide. The full country profile is available from the Project's
Database or upon request
by e-mail.
It has now been almost two years since
more than 400,000 civilians in the Philippines were forced to leave their
homes and livelihoods, once again displaced by fighting between government
security forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on the southern
island of Mindanao. The absence of any major clashes since May 2003 has
allowed the gradual return of the majority of the displaced to their homes.
However, a significant number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) -
estimated at 60,000 people - remain displaced throughout the island. Most
are reluctant to return to areas that are still highly militarised and
where landmines and frequent skirmishes threaten their safety. Others are
still waiting for the government to help them rebuild homes destroyed during
the conflict. Most returnees struggle for their daily survival in an environment
of economic depression where there are few opportunities for earning a
living. Often forced from their homes for the second or third time, the
displaced - most of whom are poor and uneducated peasants - are also generally
moved from one evacuation centre to another before reaching their final
camp. Each displacement further deepens their misery and makes it more
difficult to regain the living conditions they had prior to their flight.
The displaced are in need of rehabilitation assistance to restart their
lives, but they also need convincing that they will not be displaced again
by yet another outbreak of fighting. The next round of peace talks, scheduled
to take place in February 2005 in Malaysia, gives both the government and
the MILF a chance to put an end to a conflict which has displaced over
one and a half million Filipinos in the past five years. Only a political
solution, including provisions for the return and reintegration of IDPs
and accompanied by strong anti-poverty and development measures for Mindanao,
is likely to end the conflict and ensure that the Mindanoans will not have
to face yet another cycle of displacement and destitution.
Background and main causes of displacement
The conflict in Mindanao is rooted in the general underdevelopment of the region, the unequal distribution of wealth, and the lack of sufficient effort by the central government to integrate the Muslim population into the political and institutional fabric of the country. The rich reserves of untapped natural resources and raw materials of Mindanao, in particular in the Muslim (or "Moro") areas, are an added factor in the government's fight against Muslim secessionist movements there since the 1970s (Oxfam, November 2000, pp.4-5).
In 1996, an agreement between the government and the rebel Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was signed, providing for a ceasefire and for the creation of a priority development zone comprising 14 provinces and ten cities considered to be the poorest in the country. It was hoped that this agreement would put an end to the conflict, but by 2000 an increasing number of militants were leaving the MNLF to join the more radical MILF, which was not party to the 1996 agreement. The MILF signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1997, but this agreement has been repeatedly violated.
In March 2000 President Joseph Estrada declared "all-out war" on the MILF and fighting rapidly spread to most regions of Mindanao. By August 2000, an estimated 800,000 to one million people had been forced to flee their homes (UNDP, 13 November 2000, p.4). A ceasefire was signed in June 2001 between the MILF and the government and was reinforced two months later by the establishment of guidelines explicitly providing for the return and rehabilitation of the displaced (or "evacuees"). However, repeated violations of the ceasefire by both sides during 2001 and 2002 meant that people in Mindanao continued to be displaced by armed clashes, which also hampered the return of many IDPs to their homes.
In February 2003, when communities in Mindanao were just starting to regain enough confidence to rebuild their lives and livelihoods, large-scale military operations resumed in Central Mindanao. Hundreds of thousands of people, often the same ones who had al-ready been forced to flee in 2000, were drawn into yet another cycle of displacement. In-tense bombardments, burning of houses and a significant militarisation of the area triggered massive evacuations of people to safer places. An estimated 411,000 persons were displaced between February and May 2003 (DSWD, 9 October 2003). A ceasefire agreed upon in July 2003 put an end to the fighting and allowed for the return of most of the displaced.
At the end of February 2004, the MILF and the government met in Malaysia and agreed on the deployment of a Malaysian-led international ceasefire monitoring team (IMT) in Mindanao. The first contingent of the IMT arrived eight months later in October 2004. Tasked with the monitoring of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the government and the MILF, the IMT was based in Cotabato City and expected to complete it mandate in 12 months. The peace talks between the government and the MILF, stalled since early 2004, were scheduled to resume in February 2005 (AFP, 2 February 2005).
Few displacement incidents in 2004
Those displaced during 2003 and more recently in January 2005 were often the same people who had been forced to flee in 2000, during President Estrada's "all-out war" campaign in Mindanao. They were usually poor and uneducated peasants fleeing their homes for fear of being caught in the crossfire or after being ordered to leave by the military. The vast majority of the displaced were Muslims, a reflection of the overall ethnic composition of the areas affected by fighting (Oxfam, January 2001, p. 19). Most of them are women and children.
Internally displaced people usually seek refuge in neighbouring villages and main urban centres. They have been sheltered in evacuation centres, schoolrooms, mosques, chapels and other public buildings. The main areas of fighting and displacement in 2003 were in the provinces of Maguindanao (154,000 IDPs), North Cotabato (87,000), Sultan Kudarat (51,000), Lanao Del Sur (43,000) and Lanao del Norte (33,000) in Central and Western Mindanao (DSWD, 9 October 2003).
Since the end of the 2000 campaign, Mindanao has never really been at peace. Although with the exception of the February 2003 operation no major combats have taken place since, frequent skirmishes remained a constant threat, in particular for communities near military and rebel camps, and continued to displace smaller numbers of people.
2004 was by Mindanao's standard a fairly quiet year with no major armed incidents, al-though civilians were still subjected to occasional skirmishes and subsequent episodes of forced displacement affecting a few thousand people during the year. Thanks to the improved dialogue and confidence-building measures between the government and the MILF, namely through the Joint Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (JCCCH), armed skirmishes and army operations against criminal gangs have effectively been prevented from turning into larger armed confrontations (Mindanews, 2 January 2005). From about 500 in 2003, the number of ceasefire violations fell to 70 in 2004 (AFP, 2 February 2005).
The latest armed incident that took place
on 9 January 2005 in Maguindanao - the worst fighting in the last 18 months
- was a reminder that despite the improved cooperation and confidence-building
measures between the warring parties, tensions remain high and skirmishes
still have the potential of escalating into more significant armed conflicts.
Between 8,000 and 27,000 people were displaced by this latest episode of
fighting (Bantay Ceasefire, 16 January 2005, p.1; UNDP, 28 January 2005).
While the majority of the displaced managed to return in the weeks following
the incident, some 2,000 people remained displaced as of early February
(Government of the Philippines, 9 February 2005). Both sides were quick
to play down the incident as they stated that it would not affect the upcoming
peace talks. The MILF acknowledged responsibility for the attack, which
they claim was ordered by a renegade local commander without the approval
of the MILF leadership.
The relative calm of the previous year has allowed for the continued return of the remaining IDPs, although a significant number of people, estimated at 60,000 people, remain unable or unwilling to go back to their homes. Some live in what have become permanent evacuation centres or stay with friends and relatives (UNDP, 21 September 2004, p.1). The continued presence of MILF or government forces in villages of origin, traumatic memories of the violence the displaced have witnessed or endured, lack of basic services and limited housing possibilities are among the reasons for not returning. Many IDPs have also enrolled their children in schools in their area of displacement or have established new livelihoods and do not wish to be relocated again (Notre Dame University & Commission on Population, January 2004, pp.31-32).
Returnees need more assistance to rebuild their lives
War and displacement have greatly disrupted the lives of the people in Mindanao. Prior to the eruption of violence in 2000 and 2003, Mindanao, and in particular the Muslim-populated Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, already ranked among the poorest regions of the country (WB, 3 March 2003, p.9).
Displaced women and children were among those most directly and adversely affected by the violence and displacement. Conditions in evacuation centres were generally described as inadequate, with poor medical facilities and sanitation, resulting in health risks for the most vulnerable. Prolonged stays in the evacuation centres exposed displaced children - reported to constitute 60 to 70 per cent of the IDP population - to ailments such as flu, skin disease, coughing, measles, diarrhoea and typhoid fever (Notre Dame University & Commission on population, January 2004, p.34). Insufficient assistance meant that often all members of the family, including children, had to help out and find work outside the centres, usually working as daily labourers in neighbouring farms (CFSI, October 2003, p.36).
Returnees face many challenges upon return to their communities. These include lack of housing, food scarcity, lack of sources of livelihood, poor water and sanitation conditions, lack of farm inputs, lack of access to health care and poor education facilities for their children.
The presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance near villages and on land the displaced are returning to is putting their lives at risk and hindering their rehabilitation. Many of the displaced are farmers and are dependent on access to their land for survival. Although the MILF formally renounced the use of landmines already in 2000, it reportedly continued to use landmines and other improvised explosives devices, planting them mainly around their camps. Unexploded ordnances also constitute a real danger for the people living near areas hard-hit by the fighting in 2000 and 2003 (ICBL, October 2004). Provinces most affected by landmines are therefore those where MILF's camps are located and where most of the fighting took place in 2000 and 2003, i.e. Maguindanao, Lanao Del Sur and North Cotabato province.
The government estimates that the fighting damaged close to 7,000 houses in the months following the February 2003 operation (DSWD, 22 July 2003). Although reconstruction of houses and the building of new shelters have started, by early 2004 only some 3,000 houses had been completed, or just a little over 50 per cent of the targeted 5,800 core shelter units. By the end of March 2004, lack of funding was reportedly hampering the completion of the housing programme (DSWD, 31 March 2004).
The most commonly cited health problems are malaria and diarrhoea. There are some health services available in the Rural Health Centres, but for many IDPs they are too far away from their homes. This is seen as a significant problem by the evacuees themselves (CFSI, October 2003, p.32). Psychological trauma and stress due to the violence and sudden displacement, often accompanied by destruction or looting of property and means of livelihoods, was reported as a serious concern (Balay, 24 March 2003). A field investigation conducted in early 2004 in Maguindanao province, where fighting had displaced some 20,000 people at the end of 2003, revealed that the residents were still afraid of a resumption of violence and that they exhibited signs of extreme trauma (IID, 18 January 2004).
Prior to the fighting and displacement, levels of education were already very low in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Government figures put the proportion of children aged 15 years or more who had not completed even one year of schooling at close to 28 per cent while the national average was 4 per cent. Most of the children lucky enough to be enrolled in school have had their education disrupted by war and displacement. Upon return, many families need the support of their children to survive and cannot afford to put them back in school. Education is seen by the displaced themselves as a clear priority and sometimes as important as food and medical needs (CFSI, October 2003, p.12).
Assistance to IDPs
The Philippine government generally acknowledges its responsibility vis-à-vis IDPs and has assisted them through the National Disaster Coordinating Council, which coordinates the activities of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Office of Civil Defence, the National Red Cross and local governments. However, as was noted by the UN Secretary-General's Representative on Internal Displacement, there are often gaps between positive intentions and statements made by the government on behalf of the evacuees and their practical implementation on the ground (CHR, 3 February 2003, p.12).
These shortcomings reportedly resulted from a lack of capacity of national and local institutions to effectively deal with the scale of displacement and from a lack of funding, making local authorities, especially in the poorest areas of Mindanao, dependent on external aid to assist the displaced. This has meant that assistance was often short-term and inadequate to meet the needs of the displaced (Notre Dame University & Commission on Population Region XII, January 2004, p. 48). Other limitations of the assistance efforts include the cyclical nature of war and displacement in Mindanao, which tend to render rehabilitation efforts unsustainable, as well as the limited coverage of assistance programmes. Many evacuees did not benefit, for example, from the government's core shelter assistance although their houses where destroyed by the fighting (Janet M. Arnado & Mary Ann M. Arnado, 15 November 2004, p. 75). There have also been reports of corruption and misuse of funds intended for the reconstruction of housing for the displaced (Sun Star, 5 February 2004).
The set of guidelines for the cessation of hostilities agreed upon by the government and the MILF in August 2001 provides for the safe return of IDPs to villages of origin. In May 2002 the government and the MILF further consolidated the agreement by signing the "Implementing Guidelines on the Rehabilitation aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001" (GRP-MILF, 7 May 2002). In addition to the safe return of IDPs, the agreement provides for financial and technical assistance to the displaced to rebuild their houses and livelihoods, and compensation awarded by the government for the properties lost and/or destroyed by the conflict. Since 2001 ceasefires have been repeatedly violated and fighting and displacements have prevented full implementation of the guidelines.
Complementing the efforts of the government, many civil society bodies, including local NGOs and church organisations, participate in the relief and rehabilitation efforts, often filling existing assistance gap. A coalition of national NGOs in partnership with the UN, donors and international NGOs established in 2003 the Mindanao Emergency Response Network (MERN). This network, composed of 36 organisations, most of them local NGOs, intends to help consolidate the response to emergencies by providing emergency management training to its members and by delivering assistance to the displaced (PRWeb, 9 March 2004).
Other initiatives from civil society include the Bantay Ceasefire, a network of grassroots organisations that has since January 2003 conducted investigative missions of armed incidents and has established early warning networks in the field capable of preventing small incidents from turning into larger confrontations.
Under a government-United Nations Multi-Donor Programme, now in its third phase, the international community and the UN have over the past few years been assisting the conflict-affected region of Mindanao by providing emergency relief assistance to the displaced and assistance to communities to foster rehabilitation. They have also provided the authorities at the national and local level with assistance to deal with humanitarian emergencies. At the end of 2004, the UN Development Programme and the European Com-mission started to implement a one-year rehabilitation project benefiting people displaced by armed conflicts in Mindanao, particularly in the provinces most hit by the fighting and destruction (Government of the Philippines, 28 September 2004). The project is aimed at addressing the rehabilitation and resettlement requirements of some 10,000 displaced families (or 60,000 individuals) in 30 selected conflict-affected communities in Mindanao (UNDP, 21 September 2004, p.1).
With the formal peace talks between the MILF and the government to resume in Malaysia in February 2005, both parties now have a chance to end decades of conflict in Mindanao and reiterate their commitment to facilitate the return and rehabilitation of the displaced. Only a political solution, accompanied by strong anti-poverty and development measures for Mindanao is likely to put an end to the conflict and ensure that the conflict-affected people will have to face yet another cycle of displacement and destitution.
The full Country Profile includes all references to the sources and documents used.
